
Class : 

Book JD_5___ 

Copyright N° 

COPVRIGHT DEPOSIT: 



) 



HUNDREDTH CENTURY PHILOSOPHY. 



THE 

AUTOBIOGRAPHY 



OF THE 



I OR EGO. 



BY THE SAME AUTHOR. 



Tracts in Criticism : 

Prof. Fiske's Latest Sophistry. 5 cents. 
The Outrage of Compulsory Vaccination. 5 cents. 
The Moral Sense an Automobile — Not a Horse and Wag- 
gon. 5 cents. 

In Preparation : 

Theism in the Hundredth Century. 

Part 1 . The One Absolute and Final Reality. 

Part 2. In It and Its Activity is there Anything of the Being 

of God. 
Part 3. Supreme Consciousness and Still No Such Being. 
Part 4. Theism or Deism — Which? — Either, Neither, Both 
or What ? 



THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY 

OF THE 

I OR EGO; 

OR, 

THE METAPHYSICS 

OF AN INTERLOPER AND IMPOSTOR, 
HIMSELF IN THE ROLE OF 
CONFESSOR.' : 



BY CHARLES K?RKLAN'D WFEI gR. \V 

r 

"Art thou not thyself, perchance, 

But the universe in trance? 

A reflection inly flung 

By that world thou fanciest sprung 

From thyself — thyself a dream — 

Of the world's thinking thou the theme ?" 



BOSTON : 

PUBLISHED BY THE AUTHOR. 

9 Park Square. 

1903. 






LIBRARY of CONGRESS 
Two Copies Received 

DEC 26 1903 

Copyright Entry 

A<ML^./fr-/ 3 3 

CLASS v XXc. No. 

7xro *r b 

COPY B 







Copyright 
": by:* : 



CHARLES K. WHEELER. 



UNITY PRESS, 
New Bedford, Mass. 



PREFACE. 



The present work is in effect a disserta- 
tion to show that the ego, as referring to 
the subject as distinguished from the object, 
is not, which is to say that I am not, that 
you the reader are not self-conscious, nor 
even conscious, yet that we are so sure that 
we are; that only the thinker — which is not 
you nor I — is conscious, and not even he (or 
it) is self-conscious; to show, in a word, 
that, that we are conscious and self-con- 
scious is all illusion and even all delusion, 
except as we reason ourselves into a know- 
ledge of the illusion as only the illusion that 
it is. 



CONTENTS. 



Page. 
I — My Awareness of Myself. 11 

II — The Illusion of My Being Self-Conscious 

or Even Conscious. 19 

III — What is Consciousness ? 29 

IV — Consciousness Not Self-Conscious. 39 

V — Nothing is Self-Conscious. 47 

VI — Self -Consciousness Only an Appearance. 53 

VII — Self-Consiousness Only an Idea. 63 

VIII — We Ourselves Only an Idea. 71 

IX— World Within Like That Without. 93 

X — The Insanity of Man. 99 

XI — Summary With Closing Comment. 109 



MY AWAEENESS OF MYSELF. 



MY AWARENESS OF MYSELF. 



I was first aware of myself — aware of my- 
self as it would seem — on the occasion of 
my seeing myself, as it were by reflection in 
a mirror. If I were, verily, what is implied 
as there is thinking, namely, a thinker, there 
would be neither imposture nor impostor. 
But it is that I am not that thinker, and yet 
— deceiving myself as well as others — pose 
as being what I am not, that there are the 
imposition and I myself, the impostor, and 
very, withal, a colossal one. But, assuming 
for convenience, that I am what I pose as 
being — the thinker; assuming this to the 
end of the exposition of the very imposture 
and impostor I have in mind to lay bare, and 
I repeat that I was first aware of myself as 
myself on seeing, as by reflection in a mirror, 
2 



12 AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF THE I OR EGO. 

myself as object. Not that seeing, as by re- 
flection in a mirror, myself as object was the 
equivalent of my being aware of myself as 
myself, or that it was the cause of the event 
— for it was neither. As I discovered later, 
the former is but a step of psychical ad- 
vance, (or retrogression) of which advance, 
being aware of myself as myself is another 
and coincident one. Not, I say, that the 
thus seeing myself was the equivalent of be- 
ing aware of myself as myself, but only that 
it was the occasion or concomitant of that 
event. Just how the one step should yet 
appear to follow, or be taken simultaneous- 
ly with the other; or, just how the some- 
thing looking in the mirror should realize 
identity with that seen on looking in, that 
looking in being assumed to have no knowl- 
edge of itself as itself until it looked in, was 
not, at first blush, apparent. Indeed, on a 
little scrutiny, it was found to be absolutely 
unthinkable that, from as it were my reflec- 
tion as in a mirror, should come conscious- 
ness of it as my reflection. It was impossi- 
ble to think it; and only possible to think of 



My Awareness Of Myself. 13 

or about it — which was all anybody did, 
whatever the pretension or affectation of do- 
ing more. Or, if was possible more, it was 
only as it was to be positively thought ab- 
solutely impossible, as well as unthinkable, 
and unthinkable because impossible. Impos- 
sible and unthinkable, for there could be no 
recognition of object as subject except by 
comparison — comparison of what is known 
of subject as subject with what is recognized 
as object; and how r this comparison but as 
there was already consciousness of self and 
of self as self, and the implied knowledge of 
self with which to make the comparison? — 
which would be to say that, in order to the 
end of self-consciousness, there must first be 
some self-consciousness; first must be some 
self-consciousness for there to be self-con- 
sciousness at all! — contradiction and absur- 
dity enough. For, certainly, I say, there 
could be recognition of object as being the 
subject only by this comparison; since, how 
should I know my features in the glass as 
mine but as I knew something of my feat- 
ures, and knew of them as mine before, and 



14 AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF THE I OR EGO. 

recognize those in the glass as mine by com- 
parison and the resemblance? — how, but in 
this way, save, at least, as, perhaps, I might 
know them by a sort of direct intuition as 
mine, when, of course, it ivould not be know- 
ing them as due as it were to reflection as in a 
mirror : and that I should know them as by 
intuition is doubtful, to say the least of it. 

Just how, then, I became aware of my re- 
flection as my reflection, I could make no 
certain headway in divining. I should have 
to, at least, no longer imagine that myself 
as object as by reflection in a glass, imagine 
that perceiver deployed as the perceived, 
was either equivalent, cause, or means to 
that end. 

But should I, as I might contemplate it as 
but the occasion or coincidence of my being 
aware of myself as myself, and contemplate 
the two — my reflection as in a mirror, and 
my being aware of myself as myself — as but 
coincidents, perhaps correlatives, of each 
other and together, a stage in common in 
the development of consciousness out of a 



My Awareness Of Myself. 15 

previous stage, that previous stage one sim- 
ply of perceiving and perceived, and one in 
which there is, as yet, neither subject nor 
object as such, — should I, as I might con- 
template the two thus as an identical stage 
in the development of consciousness; and 
contemplate, moreover, the development 
from the previous stage to this identical one 
as the result of reaction of the individual 
with environment, as with all development 
is the case; — should I, I say, as I did this, 
even then, solve the mystery to a certainty? 
Again, is there, at least, doubt in the matter? 

Is there, then, no way out of the uncer- 
tainty of solution? Is there, indeed, any 
way out but as it might be demonstrated that 
the I or ego is not self-conscious — not con- 
scious of self as self — nor, indeed, even con- 
scious? — demonstrated that I myself, the 
writer, am not, that you yourself, the reader 
are not, much as we so airily and confidently 
are wont to think we are?-that we are not, 
even though so ridiculous as may seem the 
proposition that we are not? And is there, 
in fact, even this way out? May it, indeed, 



16 AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF THE I OR EGO. 

be true that we are not self-conscious, nor 
even so much as conscious, as would appear? 
Let us see. 



THE ILLUSION 

OF MY BEING SELF-CONSCIOUS 

OR EVEN CONSCIOUS. 



THE ILLUSION 

OF MY BEING SELF-CONSCIOUS 

OR EVEN CONSCIOUS. 

THEOREM 1. 



Here, to begin with, is this theorem, one 
demonstrable, the theorem, to wit, that the 
self-consciousness — self-consciousness as such 
(consciousness of self as self) — of the conscious 
self, the self something distinct from consciousness 
and back of it, but as having consciousness or 
being conscious, is not only utterly unthinkable, 
but absolutely impossible. 

And here, following, is the demonstration : 
Thus, it is, of course, only self-evident that 
there can be no self-consciousness of a thing 
not, itself, conscious. But, if there can be 
no self-consciousness of a thing not, itself, 
conscious, or until it is conscious, then, once 
it is conscious, there can be no self-con- 
sciousness but of what was in the consciousness 
of the thing simply conscious. And, as what 
5 



20 AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF THE I OR EGO. 

was in the consciousness of the latter or the 
conscious self, the self not consciousness it- 
self, yet, however, that something having con- 
sciousness or being conscious, was nothing of 
consciousness of that self (or it would be 
already self-conscious) nothing of that self 
even, much less of that self as such, then in 
the any self-consciousness as of such con- 
scious self, there could be nothing either of 
consciousness of that self as such, nor even, 
indeed, of what was that self merely. That 
is, the self as something distinct from con- 
sciousness, not being in the consciousness of the 
conscious self ivould be utterly beyond the reach 
of any act of self-consciousness. So, that the 
self-consciousness as such of the self of the 
conscious self , the self as something distinct 
from consciousness but as having conscious- 
ness or being conscious, is demonstrably, 
and here demonstrated, an absolute impossi- 
bility; and only the self-consciousness as 
such, of consciousness with its content other 
than self as distinct from consciousness itself, 
is possible, even if, indeed, that, even that 
be possible. 



Illusion Of My Being Conscious. 21 

To state it again, that it, without failure, 
be seen that there is no escape from this, — 
to state it again and thus: — Assume the self 
as something distinct from consciousness. If 
that self be not conscious, it will be allowed 
only self-evident that it could not be self- 
conscious. Assume it, then, yet that not 
consciousness itself, still as having con- 
sciousness or being conscious; then the con- 
sciousness of such conscious self could have 
nothing in it of consciousness of such self — 
otherwise, it would be already self-conscious. 
However, once ever anything like the self- 
consciousness of such conscious self obtained 
then that self-consciousness could only be a 
consciousness, itself, too, having nothing in it 
of the consciousness of such self, — other- 
wise, again, it would be something more than 
the conscious self as unconscious of itself 
that was self-conscious — something more 
which has no being ; and how could what has 
no being be conscious of itself or self-con- 
scious? Such, being a self-evident impossi- 
bility and absurdity — amounts to a reductio 
ad absurdam of the whole proposition alto- 



22 AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF THE I OR EGO. 

gether of the self-consciousness of the self of 
the conscious self, the self something dis- 
tinct from consciousness. 

To state it, even once again, — and that 
it is so contrary to the prevailing view must 
be my excuse for doing so, — the self-con- 
sciousness of a thing is the consciousness of 
of just what is that thing; and just what is that 
thing of the conscious self, the self as distinct 
from consciousness, and back of it is thing 
without consciousness of such self; and so, a 
self-consciousness of that thing without any 
consciousness of such self would be only a 
consciousness of that thing without any con- 
sciousness of such self again. It would be a 
consciousness, as it would seem, of some 
self, of course, or there would be no self- 
consciousness, as it would appear to be, at 
all; a consciousness of some self, but of what 
self, or of the self as what? — is the query. 

Self-consciousness must be either a mere 
mental attitude, the self but an abstraction, 
or it must be a consciousness of a self, an 
independent existence, or entity which, con- 
scious, is conscious of itself, — and which is 



Illusion Of My Being Conscious. 23 

it? At least, if the former, there is even no 
such thing, really, as the self, conscious, 
whoever or whatever the abstraction. But 
of this later. 

What has thus far been discovered and 
demonstrated is to the effect of what the self, 
under the circumstances, is not; and that, 
certainly, it is not anything whatsoever at 
once back of and distinct from conscious- 
ness. 

And over all, let it be remembered — that if 
the foregoing and primary proposition that a 
self — conscious- — as distinct from conscious- 
ness is incapable of self-consciousness is not 
true, then there is no such thing as a con- 
scious being that is not at the same time 
self-conscious; no such thing as a conscious 
oyster or animalcule that is not as surely 
self-conscious as are you or I. 

But now, then, anything whatsoever, to 
come into consciousness as an I or ego, can 
only do so as something self-conscious — self- 
conscious as such; can only do so as some- 
thing aware of itself, and aware of itself as 
the self it is; ivhich — thus self-conscious and 



24 AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF THE I OR EGO. 

aware of itself as the thing it is — we have just 
seen that at least a self as- at once distinct from r 
and back of, consciousness never can be; and so* 
can never come into consciousness as an I or ego* 
I say self -consciousness as such ; for self-con- 
sciousness simply, consciousness simply of 
what is self is not consciousness of self as self; 
and there can be no consciousness of the I 
or ego but as there is consciousness of self as 
such. 

But, again, if such self can never come in- 
to consciousness as an I or ego, then, the lor 
ego with which we are familiar cannot by any pos- 
sibility be the any I or ego as representing such 
self; that is, any I or ego with which we are 
familiar cannot possibly refer to anything at 
once back of consciousness and distinct from 
it; and can, at most, refer only to conscious- 
ness itself, or to something front of it as it 
were, as might be entertained, much such a 
thing, its content. 

In other words, the self-consciousness of 
such self impossible, the any I or ego as self- 
conscious and referring to it is impossible; 
and the any I or ego as self-conscious and 



Illusion Of My Being Conscious. 25 

referring to it impossible, the I or ego with 
which we are familiar and which is itself — - 
as would appear at least — self-conscious, 
cannot possibly refer to such, cannot refer 
to an I or ego the self-consciousness of which 
is impossible. 

Should it be said to all this that it is only 
saying that we, with mind such as is ours, 
can ' 'know only mind' ' ; or, perhaps, that, 
anyway, any mind whatever can know only 
mind; I reply that it is saying nothing of the 
kind. It is only saying that nothing short 
of consciousness can be conscious of itself, 
and that, as only nothing short of such can 
be, only with nothing short of such, itself, 
can any I or ego be supposed identified, or, 
to which be supposed to refer. Conscious- 
ness may be conscious of countless things 
besides itself; and in what has been said, 
has not been affirmed even that it may not 
be of matter, if that were back of it. But it 
has only been said that, itself, whatsoever 
to be self-conscious must be consciousness 
itself, or at least, nothing back of it — not 
even mind back of it, as back of it might be 
supposed unconscious mind. 



WHAT IS CONSCIOUSNESS? 



WHAT IS CONSCIOUSNESS? 
THEOREM 2. 

But now, again, if the self and I, or ego, 
cannot be identified with anything at once 
back of and distinct from consciousness, can 
it be even with consciousness itself? 

And this brings me to my second theorem, 
to wit : That consciousness cannot be conscious of 
itself, and, so, not self-conscious ; that there is no 
such thing as the self-consciousness of conscious- 
ness. Or, to state it again, that the self in any 
mental attitude of self-consciousness is but an ab- 
straction, and, so, nothing itself conscious, and 
so, again, not anything that might be self-con- 
scious. 

But, first, — What is consciousness? 

Even nothing, possibly \ but what answers to the 
glitter of a diamond. If not a substantive en- 
tity, — which, so far as I know, it was never 
once thought or even dreamt to be, but, 
rather of some such entity, somehow some 



30 AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF THE I OR EGO. 

feature, as has always been the impression 
which has prevailed — then, we may think of 
it either as a functioning, merely, of some 
more or less absolute entity; or as a state of 
that entity; or as a property of it. A func- 
tioning of it, as the pulsations of the heart 
are a functioning of that organ; a state of it, 
as diamond is one physical state of the chem- 
ical element carbon of which plumbago is 
another; or a property of it, as hardness is a 
property of that same element; or, possibly, 
an accident of it, as the glitter of the diamond 
is an accident, and a fluctuating accident, of 
that, dependent on the presence of light, de- 
pendent as even having no being, indeed, but 
for that presence. We may think of it as 
any of these. But shall we not entertain it, 
with the greater probability, as either the 
first or the last? and, with the still greater 
reason, as the last rather than the first, — 
the last and an accident answering to the glitter 
of a diamond ? The greater probability would 
seem to lie this way, since it, like the glitter 
of that form of carbon, is dependent on 



What Is Consciousness? 31 

something alien for its very being even, de- 
pendent on content for very being(so far as 
we know) as the glitter of the diamond is 
dependent on light for its being; is depen- 
dent on content, — sight, for example, or the 
special consciousness of external objects, 
being dependent for its very existence on 
the presence of those external objects; 
as, in the same way, indeed, is consciousness 
in general, at least primarily, dependent for 
its being at all — so it is commonly held — 
on the presence of the external world in gen- 
eral. 

However, which of these several alterna- 
tives consciousness is, it is not necessary 
here to determine, Only — if it be accident 
and as glitter of diamond, as in any instance 
it might be itself its own content, then that 
content would be only doubly an accident. 

And only, again, whichever it is, self-con- 
sciousness must be the same; that is, if con- 
sciousness be but an accident of an entity, 
then what is self-consciousness must itself, 
too, be such accident answering to the glit- 



32 AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF THE I OR EGO. 

ter of a diamond; and, as thus answering, 
it, as well as conscionsness again, like the 
glitter of a diamond, only something uncer- 
tain, evanescent, necessarily only local and 
not universal, precisely as accords with all 
experience as to both; and which to be said 
of both consciousness and self-conscious- 
ness, the same is, by implication, to be said 
of the I or ego they involved, and that it 
(the I or ego) too, is but local, fitful and tem- 
porary as are they. 

But if not necessary here that is deter- 
mined which of the alternatives in question 
consciousness is, what yet is here necessary 
is knowledge of something the relation of 
consciousness and content. 

I have already said that that relation is 
one of dependence, the former on the latter 
at least as glitter of diamond on light. And 
so far as we know, this is the case. There 
must be content such as feeling, or percept, 
or concept; content which must be con- 
sciousness, itself, at least when it is nothing 
else that content; consciousness then vary- 



What Is Consciousness? 33 

ing, in a way, as content varies. In other 
words, we know consciousness only by con- 
tent, which is to say, by its states; or, in 
still a little different phrasing, we know only 
states of consciousness, know nothing of it 
absolutely and as a part from its states, any 
more than we know anything of the glitter 
of carbon apart from the carbon's allotropic 
state of diamond. 

But, still, though on the score just indica- 
ted they are inseparable, yet are they utterly 
distinct; as much so as are surface and solid, 
or as the lines forming an angle from an 
angle which they form — as solid or angle 
are to obtain, The surface is not the solid 
itself, nor the lines the angle itself; neither 
is consciousness nor content, either the other 
itself. The latter is, as it were, the thing 
thought utterly distinct from the former and 
what is to the effect of the thinker of the 
thing thought, — utterly distinct, equally 
whether consciousness is thinker, an inde- 
pendent entity though we cannot realize it, 
or whether only a function, accident or the 
like, of such thinker and entity. 



34 AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF THE I OR EGO. 

Whether consciousness is entity of itself 
and thinker, we do not know. We may 
know of such a thing as capacity and capac- 
ity for consciousness; but we do not know 
of capacity of what for it. And for one rea- 
son among others, that the what, whatever 
it is, never — as we earlier had occasion to 
make evident even to a demonstration — 
comes to the surface in self-consciousness, 
of which it is infinitely.. incapable; never 
comes to the, surface in self-consciousness 
and as I or ego — never ^_ „- .. 

What is capacity may involve, as the 
best we can understand, positive entity and 
thinker, and, yet, such, as behind thinking 
or thought, is purely and only an idea of 
something as behind that we have, as it is 
purely and only an idea, that we have, of an 
impressor as of an outward world behind 
impressions; it is not anything, in either 
case, of which we have positive knowledge. 
It is nothing we can have direct knowledge 
of through self-consciousness — as I have a 
said and said again and again — or otherwise. 



What Is Consciousness ? 35 

It no more follows in the one case that there 
is, indeed, a thinker than in the other that 
there is an impressor, — but it as much fol- 
lows. I say, with no more absolute knowl- 
edge do we get behind thinking or thought 
than we get behind impressions. We can 
do so in either case only as knowing, as there 
is anything behind, what such thing is not — 
nothing positive what it is. 

However, be all this as it may, conscious- 
ness and content are not in the least, under 
any circumstances to be confounded. They 
are things diverse altogether in that, while 
the former must be understood, of course, 
in a way as itself conscious, as itself shining 
of its own light, the latter, on the contrary, 
must be positively recognized as not itself 
conscious at all; or, if shining or appearing 
to shine, recognized that it does so not of 
its own but of a borrowed light. Content 
must, I say, be positively entertained as that 
having no consciousness of its own, but 
which, still, if possibly, seeming at any time 
such to have, to thus seem to have it, only 
in virtue of relations with something else 
7 



36 AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF THE I OK EGO. 

which as having consciousness of its own, 
gives to what has none of its own, the ap- 
pearance of having such of its own. 



CONSCIOUSNESS NOT SELF-CONSCIOUS- 



CONSCIOUSNESS NOT SELF-CONSCIOUS. 
THEOREM 2. 
Continued.) 



But now then, theorem second, aforesaid, 
That the self -consciousness of consciousness is 
impossible. 

I am conscious of a brick, — is the brick 
conscious? — or more, the brick as content 
of my consciousness? No more, any other 
thing as that content; no more, as I have 
now to say, even as it might be conscious- 
ness itself — itself as it would seem — its own 
content. That, come to be a content of 
itself is another thing — it is no longer con- 
sciousness. It is then a matter of reflection 
and becomes object; and as object what was 
a live thing becomes a dead one. It becomes 
an image only. As an image, it is not con- 
sciousness itself; at such moment it is not 
itself. 

To state it a little differently — a thing as 
object — object as representatively object — is 



40 AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF THE I OR EGO. 

never seen for such as it is in itself. Or, 
to put it the other way about, what is a thing 
such as it is in itself, is, as seen as object, 
never seen. And the simple fact of con- 
sciousness having become object, bars it at 
once from being recognized for such as it is 
in itself, which is something conscious. As 
such as it is in itself as something conscious, 
it, as such as it is not in itself, would be what 
is not conscious. I say consciousness itself 
— itself as it would seem — as content oc- 
cupying consciousness is no more that con- 
tent conscious than is the brick aforesaid, 
as content occupying it, conscious. Why, 
can a man hold himself in his own lap, pray? 
No more can consciousness hold itself in its 
own lap. But what the man can do is to 
hold a picture of himself in his own lap (but, 
as we will find later, he does not, in the men- 
tal attitude of self-consciousness, do even 
that, but holds only a picture of someone else 
or thing as "himself" in his lap.) 

He can hold a picture of himself in his own 
lap, and that is all consciousness itself can 
do. But is that picture, itself, of the man a 



What Is Consciousness? 41 

living thing and conscious as is the man? 
No more is what is only the picture of con- 
sciousnes, as the latter affects to hold itself 
in its own lap, conscious. And if not con- 
scious, then it cannot be self-conscious, — ■ 
and there can be no such thing as the self- 
consciousness of consciousness. That can be 
no self-consciousness of consciousness which is 
but a consciousness of a self itself not conscious. 

So, I repeat that no more than can a man 
hold himself in his own lap, can conscious- 
ness hold itself in its own; and that it cannot, 
is fatal to the self-consciousness of conscious- 
ness, as it is to the latter itself itself as the 
content of itself. 

That what the man holds in his own lap, 
or consciousness in its, is, at most, but a 
picture, — that what, in other words, the 
"himself" or "itself" in the mental attitude 
of self-consciousness, with consciousness it- 
self — as it affects to be — its own content, is 
but a pure abstraction, a concept of a sort, 
simply a creature of the imagination, may be 
afforded confirmation variously. And in one 
way, the following. 



42 AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF THE I OR EGO. 

Be it noticed that, that consciousness, so 
far as we know, obtains only with content 
is as true of it, it itself the content of itself as of 
it as that of which itself is the content. 

Now, the closest introspection by any one 
accustomed to that sort of thing will fail to 
realize any content, whatsoever, to the con- 
sciousness — consciousness as it effects to be 

of 
— itself the cowter^consciousness. This of 

itself should make it only self-evident that 
such content is not the genuine article at all; 
rather that it is but a counterfeit present- 
ment; or at least that we are wholly without 
warrant for any contrary inference. And 
make it only self-evident, again, that the 
"himself" or "itself" involved is only a 
dream, a conjuration of the mind; not an 
independent entity, entity the "conscious 
self, ' ' or any other. 

The one only conclusion to come to in all 
this is that consciousness is at an infinite re- 
move from possibility of self-consciousness — 
that it is only an idea of it that upon reflec- 
tion we have of it, and to which content is 



Consciousness Not Self-Conscious. 43 

not necessary ; and that it is, of course, 
moreover at an infinite remove from identi- 
fication with I or ego, identification with 
which could obtain only in the event of its 
self-consciousness. 



NOTHING IS SELF-CONSCIOUS. 



NOTHING IS SELF-CONSCIOUS. 



But now, then, if not anything back of 
consciousness, nor, yet, even that itself and 
as itself its own content, can be self-con- 
scious, what conceivable is there left, as 
what might be, but some possible content 
other than the latter itself, that content? 
Nothing. 

But what are we to expect of any other 
which has not even the appearance of being 
conscious, let alone being so in reality, 
which appearance, at least consciousness, 
itself its own content, has? Why, man- 
ifestly, with the greater reason, the same 
fate of consciousness itself, its own con- 
tent. And what, then, can be self-conscious? 
Nothing! And is, indeed, the subjective 
world, much like the objective — all illusion? 
I answer — Yes! — at least the one as much 
as the other. 



48 AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF THE I OR EGO. 

And, pray, why not the one as much as 
the other? Is it the assumption that we 
see subjectively without faculties? It is but 
assumption. But, if half our faculties in 
their primary and direct deliverance mis- 
carry, why not the other half? Why, in all 
reason, assume the contrary? What could 
be more utterly illogical than to assume one 
half of them to deliver falsely, and yet not 
to assume the other half to ? — to suppose 
not a few, in effect, downright liars, and, 
yet, that the as many remaining, are only 
scrupulously truthful? And is, indeed, not 
the primary and direct deliverance of the 
half we distinguish as the senses a flat con- 
tradiction of the facts? 

Does the sun veritably rise and set? Is 
the green in the grass where we see it? 
Does the moon shine of its own light? Is 
visual light an outlying independent objec- 
tive entity as appears? — and so on to the 
end of the endless list. 

But if primary and direct deliverance de- 
livers nothing without for such as it is in it- 
self, what it is but — shall I say — down- 



Nothing Is Self -Conscious. 49 

right idiocy to suppose such deliverance 
delivers otherwise within? But if the situa- 
tion is in the one case as in the other, then 
the illusion in matters of the world within 
is as complete as it is in the world without. 
Then why not be logically consistent about 
it and admit the fact to whatever perdition 
it carries us? 

The fact of it is, as would appear, that it 
is the secondary or indirect deliverance that 
in good degree or altogether is to be relied 
on to bring us as near to final truth as our 
minds, for their nature, will admit. It is 
the indirect deliverance that informs us that 
it is the revolution of the earth upon its axis 
that gives to the sun the appearance of ris- 
ing and setting; that the moon shines by 
reflected light ; that visual light is a creation 
of the eye and mind, and not an outlying 
independent objective entity; and so on. 



SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS ONLY AN AP- 
PEARANCE LIKE THE SUN'S RISING; 
IT IS EVEN CONSCIOUSNESS NOT OF 
ONE'S SELF BUT OF SOMEBODY ELSE 
OR THING. 



SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS ONLY AN 
APPEARANCE. 

THEOREM 3. 



But now a third theorem, namely, — TJiat 
the self-consciousness the experience of everyone, 
is consciousness, not of one's self but of some- 
body else or thing. 

I have said that logically at least, a thing 
to be self-conscious must first be, itself, con- 
scious; that the only thing we absolutely 
know to be conscious is consciousness itself; 
that even that could not be self-conscious 
unless a man could hold himself in his own 
lap; that as he cannot, then there can be 
no self-consciousness of consciousness, and 
as not of anything not conscious, then 
not of anything whatsoever. And, yet, that 
has been demonstrated all this, there is, in 
consciousness as is everyone's experience, 
as is not to be denied, what passes for self- 



54 AUTOBIOGRAPHY Of THE 1 OR E<30< 

consciousness a reality. It must, then, be 
a deliverance of what is only an appearance 
of such. There is no possible alternative. 
And what is that appearance, in other words? 
Why, it is the conscious self or thinker 
thinking the thinker is conscious of the 
thinker when the thinker is not. Stated 
more loosely — it is the thinker thinking 
he is conscious of himself when he is not. 
True enough, he is, indeed, conscious of 
such a thing as self, and of consciousness 
of that self, and of that self he is thinking of 
as the thinker conscious of that self. But 
that is the whole of it; that self he is think- 
ing of is not the thinker who or which is think- 
ing of that self, at all. That self must be the 
self of someone else or thing; for the thinker* 
as must be plain enough to everyone, can- 
not possibly be thinking he is thinking of 
himself, when he is not, but as he is think- 
ing of someone else or thing as himself. 
And it is the self of that someone else or thing 
that is the self he is thinking of as the think- 
er thinking of that self, and which, in fact, 
does not even think at all. It is that self, 



Self-Consciousness Only An Appearance. 55 

and which he has to be thinking of as he is 
thinking he is thinking of himself when he 
is not. 

So that as is admitted, as we have found 
it has to be, that self-consciousness can be 
only an appearance, and as, consequently, 
the thinker cannot be thinking of himself 
when he thinks he is, it therefore would 
appear rather something self-evident than 
something more formally to be demonstrated 
that self-consciousness such as is the com- 
mon experience, is the consciousness not of 
one's self but of somebody else or thing. 

As this is what it is, however, the thinker 
is the victim of a double illusion and delu- 
sion: first, in being of the mind that he is 
conscious of himself when he is not, and 
second, in being, negatively at least, of the 
mind that he is not conscious of somebody 
else or thing when he is. To make further 
evident how he is this victim, let us see by 
an illustration how it comes to pass; as also 
how what is only an appearance of self-con- 
sciousness obtains. 

It is all inconceivable but as obtaining 



56 AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF THE I OR EGO. 

only in one way; and that is as the conscious 
self loses itself in the some content of its 
own consciousness which content it mistakes 
for itself. In other words, it is as the thinker 
loses himself in his own some thought or idea 
which, or the subject-matter of which, he mis- 
takes for himself, and does so only because lost 
in it. And this, as being the only one order 
of experience conceivable in which such self- 
consciousness can obtain, it is only gross 
outrage of all rules of legitimate inference if 
it be not recognized as of the order in fact 
in which it obtains. 

But to illustrate, as I have said. So now, 
here, say, is Macready having assumed the 
the theatrical part of King John and lost in 
it. As lost in it, he is not conscious of, 
knows nothing of, Macready, who is as ut- 
terly alien to him as is Sam Jones or John 
Smith. He is, himself, to himself, King 
John conscious and self-conscious — nothing 
more. Suppose, now, I say to you, the 
reader, — " Macready is not conscious of 
himself, but of himself as King John. ' ' If 
you are quick, you will at once reply, — 



Self-Consciousness Only An Appearance. 57 

"But he has to be conscious of himself to 
be conscious of himself as King John. ' ' And, 
still, Macready is not conscious of Macready ; 
and so not conscious of himself. 

Here would seem paradox enough, in- 
deed. But the situation is this: Macready 
has now the experience of what passes for 
self-consciousness 'precisely as when he was 
himself. And, yet, he has no consciousness 
of Macready and, so, none of any "himself" 
as Macready. What is the "self" or "him- 
self "in his present condition is King John. 
In his consciousness, self-consciousness is 
simply King John conscious of King John — 
the "self" or "himself" in his mind being 
the king. There is no Macready in it any- 
where in Macready 's consciousness. There 
is in his consciousness, consciousness of Mac- 
ready' s thinking, but not of the thinking as 
Macready's. So that, Macready does not 
have to be conscious of himself (Macready), 
to be conscious of himself as King John; for 
the only self or himself in his consciousness 
all the while is that of the King. And the 
paradox is not so much of a one after all. 



58 AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF THE I OR EGO. 

But this is not all, for it is all to say that 
Macready as he experiences l 'self-concious- 
ness" is concious not of Macready but of 
somebody else and only somebody else, namely, 
the king, again — which is exactly the point I 
was to demonstrate. 

And we have only to suppose the situation 
to be precisely the same as the thinker 
might be unknown, and the offspring of the 
imagination of that unknown thinker whom 
or which offspring he (or it) mistakes to be 
himself to be, instead of King John, some 
veritable John Smith as we know him to be, 
(or, perhaps some professor of metaphysics 
in one of our universaties), — we have only 
to suppose the situation precisely the same, 
to have a perfect understanding of how, 
what we know of a logical certainty is only 
an appearance of self-consciousness, obtains 
in John Smith's mind — John Smith's as it 
would appear; and, of course, how obtains 
what is such in general. 

This is the one only way conceivable. 
And it is due to ourselves, as we would not 
live in a delusion as well as in an illusion, 



Self-Consciousness Only An Appearance. 59 

that we recognize without evasion or delay 
that there has to be a way to what we have 
to recognize, as I have demonstrated to a 
certainty, is only a fictitious self-conscious- 
ness anyway that is the experience of any- 
one. As the one only way, that just indi- 
cated completely covers the case. And as 
it does, and is the only one conceivable, it 
is only consistent with the rigorous require- 
ments of sound reasoning that it be recog- 
nized as the way, the way even as demon- 
strated — at least until, perchance, as it 
should seem impossible, some other shall 
come to the surface to be found more plau- 
sible. That is to say, is only consistent 
with sound reasoning that it be received 
as demonstrated that self-consciousness 
such as is the experience of everyone is the 
consciousness of someone else or thing, 
and not of one's self, at all. It is the con- 
sciousness by the thinker of some John Smith 
of a sort and not of himself at all. 

But it is a way as carries with it, as will 
not fail to be understood, not only that, in 
the experience which passes for self-con- 
10 



60 AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF THE I OR EGO. 

sciousness, there is no self in it an entity con- 
scious and self-conscious and that entity the 
thinker, but that there is no entity at all 
anyway in it; and, even worse than this, 
no self as standing for, or referring to any; 
and that, if it stands for or refers to anything 
whatever beyond itself, it is only to some- 
thing of the order of a mental abstraction, 
again, such as is itself. 

And, yet, as all this is so, then since it is 
all right the contrary of the direct delivery 
of itself in consciousness as that delivery is 
universally recognized, — as this is all so, I 
say, it, the self, is not a thing on its face 
such as it is in itself. 

But as a thing on its face not such as it is 
in itself, it is an illusion ; and so wide is it 
of appearing in its true character, so alto- 
gether right the contrary of that that it is, 
in truth, illusion of the deepest dye — a posi- 
tive fraud, indeed; and, of course, the any 
I or ego as referring to it illusion of the deep- 
est dye and a positive fraud along with it. 



WHAT PASSES FOR SELF -CONSCIOUS- 
NESS IS AN EXPERIENCE OF AN 
IDEA ONLY OF IT, NOT OF SELF- 
CONSCIOUSNESS ITSELF. 



SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS ONLY AN IDEA. 



But now the demonstration to this point 
has been more a direct and positive one of 
what self-consciousness and the self involved 
are not, and only incidentally what they are ; 
in other words, only in good part an indirect 
and negative one of what they positively are 
as demonstrating directly and positively 
what they were not was indirectly and neg- 
atively demonstrating what as the only al- 
ternative they must be. 

In what foil ows, I am rather to reverse 
all this, and directly and positively make 
incontrovertible what they are, while only 
indirectly and negatively proving what they 
are not. 

In still other words, it is to put beyond 
controversy that self-consciousness is only 
an idea; an idea with which the thinker is 
exercised, an idea of an experience in con- 
sciousness rather than the experience itself 
which he has. 



64 AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF THE 1 OR EGO. 

That the distinction I am making may be 
clearly understood, let me, as it were, call to 
the stand Macready lost in the idea of being 
King John. 

* * Macready, where did you say you 
were going?" "Macready! — that's not I, — 
Who's Macready? I am King John. ' ' i 'Then 
you are King John, are you ?" "Certainly." 
1 'Then, if you are at any time self-conscious 
as you think, it is King John conscious of 
King John?" "Why, yes; who else could 
it be conciousness of ?" Then in your mind, 
your self-consciousness is consciousness of 
the king. ' ' ' 'Why, of course' ' 

Here Macready's whole experience of 
self-consciousness is an idea of King John's 
being self-conscious. He has no conscious- 
ness of Macready, and so, of course, no ex- 
perience of Macready's being self-conscious. 
And this is what I mean by having only an 
idea of self-consciousness as contrasted with 
an experience of it itself, as would be Mac- 
ready conscious of Macready. 

Need I insist that to have the former is 
not to have the latter ? To have an idea 



Self-Consciousness Only An Idea. 65 

simply of going to the moon is not to go. 
Who should say they were one and the same 
thing would be a little moony or luny him- 
self. And so, who should say that to have 
an idea of being self-conscious is one and the 
same with being so would be a little moony 
or luny too, and a fit subject for an in- 
sand asylum, even tho it should be one -of 
the professors in the chair of metaphysics 
or psychology of our greatest university who 
should say it ; and he should be committed 
forthwith. 

But it is the same as the thinker is 
not Macready, and is even an unknown 
thinker and one passing in cog. as in the 
present pilgrimage into metaphysics; and 
as, also, the sport of the imagination, is not 
a deceased king but a living embodiment of 
what is in the mind of the thinker, like some 
acquaintance of ours, say, John Smith, again. 

But the truth of the proposition that it is 
only an idea of self-consciousness with which 
the thinker (or the minds of men) is exer- 
cised will receive ample warrant for its rec- 
ognition as is demonstrated a fourth and 



66 AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF THE I OR EGO. 

final theorem, which itself could be demon- 
strated only as the above at the same time 
was, and which I am immediately coming 
to. This latter, tho the last, might well 
have been my first theorem, as it is little 
more, in the main, than what in their en- 
semble are those preceding — save as would 
be implied as their demonstration was more 
an indirect and negative one of what the 
demonstration of this last is rather such as is 
direct and positive, and with the incidental 
result of the confirmation of those going be- 
fore ; is rather such as is direct and positive 
and is so by demonstrating specifically what 
the idea in ultimate or genuine form is in 
which the thinker is lost that it, or the sub- 
ject matter of it, should be delivered in con- 
sciousness as itself conscious and self-con- 
scious when it is neither. 

I say that in making plain the truth of 
this final proposition, will be made more 
evident and only too evident to be disputed, 
that self-consciousness is only an idea of an 
experience, and not the experience itself; 
only an idea, and, yet, be it noted, with an 



Self-Consciousness Only An Idea. 67 

experience in consciousness just as real as 
the genuine article to the thinker who or 
which masquerades as you or I; just as real 
as were it very self-consciousness itself. The 
same as was just as real to Macready, as 
were it veritably Macready conscious of Mac- 
ready, his consciousness of King John as 
conscious of King John. 



11 



THE I OR EGO AND AS CONSCIOUS AND 
SELF-CONSCIOUS ONLY AN IDEA AND 
NOT WHAT IS AN INDEPENDENT EN- 
TITY ITSELF CONSCIOUS AND SELF- 
CONSCIOUS. 
IN SHORT, WE OURSELVES ONLY AN 
IDEA, AND AS ONLY AN IDEA, WE 
OURSELVES NEITHER SELF-CON- 
SCIOUS NOR EVEN CONSCIOUS. 



WE OURSELVES ONLY AN IDEA. 

THEOREM 4. 



But that final theorem — it is this, namely, 
that the lor ego is but an idea, an idea actualized, 
and a phenomenon; that it is not, itself, a con- 
scious or self-conscious existence at all, but only 
that of which that, that has, itself, conscious exist- 
ence has consciousness, the I or ego being con- 
scious of nothing; that, as still posing as such ex- 
istence, it is, in effect at least, an interloper and 
impostor. 

I mean to say that I myself am not con- 
scious, much as I may think I am ; that you 
are not ; that that we are, and are self-con- 
scious is an illusion; and very a delusion as 
widespread as is the illusion. This is not to 
say that there is not consciousness, not self- 
consciousness of a sort; but that/is not I, 
that it is not you, that are either conscious 
or self-conscious. 

Now, the I or ego, as will not be disputed, 
could not obtain but as what is supposed to 



72 AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF THE 1 OR EGO. 

be self-consciousness obtained. Nor dis- 
puted, again, that, as the latter did obtain, 
the any I or ego, as obtaining, referred to 
the self involved and was practically the self 
over again recognized under an alias of term. 
Again, as is by no one doubted, what is sup- 
posed to be self-consciousness could not 
obtain but as critical with the moment of 
that mental experience is the recognition of 
something as object — object as object. 

Now, then, that only something which it 
could possibly be would be what is the only 
correlative of object as object, namely, sub- 
ject as subject. And, yet, this is not what 
is delivered in consciousness as that that 
seen in the moment of self-consciousness, is 
seen as object. What is so delivered as ob- 
ject is self, self understood as thinker. Un- 
less, then, subject and thinker are one and 
the same, subject must be in disguise. 

But what is subject ? Why, a concept, 
an idea, something thought — not a thing 
which thinks as is the thinker. It is but an 
idea, an idea of something a stand-off and 
distinct from something else, the latter, the 



We Ourselves Only An Idea. 73 

stood-off-from being recognized as object. I 
say subject is but an idea, and an idea as 
of something a mere stand-off to something 
else, stand-offness being the very quintes- 
sence of subject, the very quintessence of 
the subjectness of subject, It is but an 
idea and this one, and one which easily 
lending itself to being thought in active 
and positive assertion of itself, would in 
any deliverance such as I am, be under- 
stood as subject asserting its stand-offness 
and distinctness from object; the I (or ego) 
asserting distinctness from the not-I, — the 
I in solemn and earnest protestation that 
itself was not the not-I and was some- 
thing apart from it. Subject is but this idea, 
I repeat, and one as in which the thinker 
might be lost, one which must inevitably be 
felt to be thus in this assertion of itself, and 
the thinker himself in assertion of its asser- 
tion, and the subject realized as conscious 
and self-conscious in the assertion as was the 
thinker himself conscious and self-conscious; 
the same as Macready, lost in the idea of 
being King John, felt as was supposed did 



74 AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF THE I OR EGO. 

the king, and whom was felt to be conscious 
and self-conscious as was Macready himself. 

The subject, I again affirm, is just this 
idea, and as an idea and something thought, 
something necessarily dependent for its be- 
ing, while the thinker is at least conceivable 
as independent; something necessarily de- 
pendent and on two things — on the thinker 
to think it, and on object — either of which 
absent and it itself is absent, it itself does 
not in the least obtain. Subject is but an 
idea, shall I emphasize once more, some- 
thing thought, and not something like 
thinker which thinks. And as something 
thought and only something thought some- 
thing utterly distinct from thinker which 
thinks as surely as there is such thinker; as 
utterly, as infinitely, distinct as watch from 
watchmaker, or as is King John of Mac- 
ready's imagining from Macready himself. 

Of course, as I have said early in this 
writing, we do not know with absolute know- 
ledge that there is a thinker behind think- 
ing, any more than that there is an outlying 
objective world behind impressions. But 



We Ourselves Only An Idea, 75 

at least it is inconceivable by the human 
mind that there should not be. Thinking 
we do absolutely know there is; but that 
that thinking is itself its own thinker, that 
thinking is thinker thinking, or that thought 
is itself thinker thinking, is quite a little too 
much for our minds to grasp. It is as in- 
conceivable by us as acting without an actor, 
or motion without a thing in motion. And, 
indeed, I may say that it is universally re- 
cognized that for all purposes of intelligent 
thought at least, thinker as distinct from 
thinking or thought is to be understood, So 
I repeat, that as there is thinker distinct 
from thought, subject is a matter of thought 
and so not the thinker but utterly distinct 
from the same. 

That the contrary has the authority of all 
the ages and of all the most eminent minds 
of those ages makes it so much the worse 
for those ages and those eminent minds and 
not for the truth as I am maintaining it. 

That subject is not the thinker that is seen 
as supposed in the critical moment of self- 
consciousness is what I have been contend- 
12 



76 AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF THE I OR EGO. 

ing all along in the preceding pages; and so 
by implication contending that thinker is 
not one and the same with it which is what 
is seen or, at least, looked at if not seen, in 
that critical moment. 

But that thinker is utterly distinct from 
subject and, incidentally, that the former 
is not self-conscious may be demonstrated 
by an approach of the matter on entirely 
another tack. And thus: Object as object 
is what as appears. If what as appears is 
something of human — call it human for con- 
venience — creation or imagination, then 
what as appears is such as it is in itself; but 
if not of human creation or imagination, then 
what as appears is not such as it is in itself. 
A brick is something of human origin. A 
brick, then, as what as appears, is such as it 
is in itself — a brick. But the substance of 
the brick is not of human origin; so that 
what as appears and is, as we recognize it, 
matter, is not such as it is in itself. 

Now something confessedly is seen as ob- 
ject in the moment of self-consciousness. 
As seen as object, it is what as appears. If 



We Ourselves Only An Idea. 77 

what as, at that critical moment appears, is 
something of human origination, then it is 
such as it is in itself. If, on the contrary, 
not something springing of that source, then 
what as appears is not such as it is in itself. 
But what as appears in the moment of self- 
consciousness is as seen, as universally ad- 
mitted, the thinker as self seen. But is the 
thinker something of human origin? If not, 
then what as appears as seen, or at least 
looked at, in that critical moment is not such 
as it is in itself, and the thinker as self as 
what as appears is not what obtains such 
as it is in itself — that is, it is not the thinker, 
that is the self. 

But what, then, must it be which, at that 
critical moment, is so seen or at least looked 
at? Why, must be what is the only correla- 
tive of object, which is subject, and which is 
of human or the thinker's creation, and which 
understood as self and as what as appears is 
the self such as it is in itself as we should 
expect as it was of the above derivation. 

Subject and thinker, then, are not one 
and the same as here positively demonstra- 



78 AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF THE I OR EGO. 

ted; far one could not possibly be seen or 
looked at in the critical moment of con- 
sciousness but as the other was if the two 
were one and the same. But they are, in- 
deed, no more one and the same than are 
watch and watchmaker; they are infinitely 
distinct, at least if so be thought and thinker. 
Subject as something thought and only 
something thought, is not, then, something 
itself conscious and self-conscious. Such 
a thing as the conscious subject is an absur- 
dity. There is no such thing. Those who 
talk such metaphysical jargon seem to be 
under something the impression that subject 
is one thing and subject as subject quite 
another; and that the former is one with the 
the thinker, and the latter perhaps not. But 
there is no difference and no distinction 
whatever. When metaphysical subject is 
not subject as subject, there is no subject at 
all — it has no being. As not the latter, it is 
not subject at all — only thing. On the least 
remove from thing, as it is subject at all, it 
is subject as subject; there is no half-way 
station at which it is the former and not the 



We Ourselves Only An Idea. 79 

latter. Conscious subject, in fact, is not 
only a contradiction and an absurdity but 
something positively ridiculous, no matter 
how time-honored and eminent the authori- 
ty behind it. 

But you say, there is the thought object, 
and why is there not, must there not be the 
thinking subject ? Well, simply because 
there is no must about it — and there is none 
such whatever. What precisely there is is 
this: There is the thought subject as well as 
the thought object; and the thought subject 
thought conscious and self-conscious. In 

other words, there is the thinker thinking 
the subject, as I have just pointed out, and 
then thinking that thought subject conscious 
and self-consciousness; exactly as Macready 
lost in the idea of himself as King John, 
thinks, first, in logical order, the king of his 
imagination and, then, thinks that creature of 
his thought conscious and even self-conscious 
as he must as beside himself thinking himself 
that creature. 

So that while there is the thought object, 
there is at the same time, as I said a moment 



SO AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF THE I OR EGO. 

ago, the thought subject thought conscious; 
but no conscious subject itself at all. It is 
the thought subject thought conscious that 
is the correlate of the thought object. 

The thinker can not be the thing he im- 
agines; he can only imagine his being that 
thing; and what only he can do he does do ? 
and only does by losing himself in what he 
imagines. By thus losing himself, he is not 
being what he imagines. As he loses himself 
in the idea of being my neighor, John Smith, 
is he John Smith himself? — and is there two 
John Smiths and no Macready? 

The situation, then, is the thinker think- 
ing the idea of subject, the subject as assert- 
ing itself and conscious and self-conscious 
and lost in that idea, wherefore subject(self) 
and its tender of I or ego should appear in the 
thinker's consciousness conscious and self- 
conscious. 

And now, why, indeed, might not- — even 
were it not demonstrable, as I have assumed 
it to be, and even assumed it being positively 
demonstrated in these pages. — Why might 
not the thinker think a thought, as it w r ere 



We Ourselves Only An Idea. 81 

a theatrical part, think the idea of sub- 
ject as subject that part, and in thinking it 
be lost in it? — which, as he might be, it 
would be with the difference between think- 
er and actor, only this, that the former in 
once thinking the part of the idea of subject 
as subject and I or ego, and being lost in it, 
never comes directly (only indirectly by rea- 
soning about it as I now do) to recognize 
that he had been lost in his thought or 
idea of his own thinking, while the actor 
does. The actor does come to himself, in 
time, to recognize, and directly, that it was 
but a histrionic role and character he was 
assuming, and in which, for the time being, 
he had been lost. But does any one know 
any reason why the thinker, universal among 
men, might not be lost in his (or its) own 
some certain thought, and never come to 
himself (or itself) directly to know himself as 
having been thus lost in his own thought or 
idea? — know why, once lost in the some such 
idea as subject as subject, he must not not 
ever come to himself directly and know him- 
self directly and know himself as having 



82 AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF THE I OR EGO. 

been lost in that idea? — not ever, at least, 
until this life is over? 

Or, why, moreover, should not the think- 
er so lost, be, still, something as utterly as 
ever distinct from the thought, distinct from 
subject as subject and from the I or ego 
which, as referring to the subject is practi- 
cally subject itself? — why not as distinct and 
no more one and the same with subject 
than is the actor, lost in the part he is acting, 
one and the same with the part, — than is 
Macready, interpreting the part of the king 
and lost in it, one and the same as the king? 
When Macready in the part of the king and 
lost in it exclaims, I am murdered, — is it 
Macready that so exclaims of himself- — or as 
the king dies is it Macready who is dead? 
And not more, when the thinker in thinking 
the thought of subject as subject and lost 
in it exclaims, / am conscious, it is the thinker 
which thinks and says as of itsetf (or himself) 
I — I — am conscious. Neither more, again 
would it be, or, at least, need it be, the think- 
er dead, as died the subject and I or ego; 
not more, at least need it be, even yet that, 



We Ourselves Only An Idea. 83 

as the former died, must die the latter. 
The thinker in it all, is as I have insisted 
time and again, never once se(/*-conscious 
— conscious of himself, never once directly 
conscious at all of what is he, himseli, but only 
conscious ever of what he, himself, is not : 
he is only ever conscious of the subject which 
is not he, himself. Indeed, in what I myself 
and you yourself, affect to know of our- 
selves as ourselves, the thinker in such- 
wise knows nothing of himself (or itself) ; nor 
we, ourselves, of the thinker: any more than 
Macready, lost in the histrionic part of the 
king, knows anything of Macready whom, 
if brought to reason about, it would be, in 
his consciousness, as about an altogether other 
and alien person like, as it were, Sam Jones 
or John Smith. He has no consciousness of 
himself, he has only an idea of something, 
namely, subject and lor ego as being conscious 
of ^self ; and, being lost in the idea, he does 
not know it as only an idea; and, to him, 
it is subject and I or ego just as really con- 
scious and self-conscious, as to Macready, lost 
in the idea of being King John, it is King 
13 



84 AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF THE I OR EGO. 

John of his imagining conscious and self- 
conscious. 

And, still, you could no more beat it out 
of the direct deliverance in consciousness of 
any human mind, that subject and I or ego 
which is to say, what the man understands 
by * 'himself, ' ' is not the thinker, is not that 
which is conscious and seemingly self-con- 
scious still that it is only something of which 
something or somebody is conscious, than 
you could beat it out of Macready, lost in 
role of King John, that that King John of his 
imagination was not the thinker in the case 
and which was conscious and self-conscious 
— self-conscious as it would seem — rather 
than Macready. 

Of course, it will be said that, still, the 
thinking, in the case of King John, is Mac- 
ready's thinking, is the thinker's thinking. 
But what is Macready 's or the thinker's think- 
ing is not, itself Macready himself or the 
thinker himself thinking; and the self is some- 
thing of what is their thinking. It is, there- 
fore, nothing itself conscious; as not con- 
scious, it cannot be self-conscious. 



We Ourselves Only An Idea. 85 

So that to say that the thinking is Mac- 
ready's or the thinker's does not help the 
matter at all as to its being King John or 
subject and I or ego they themselves con- 
scious and self-conscious and thinking. 

I have now directly and positively demon- 
strated that the something which, in the crit- 
ical moment of consciousness, as object is 
recognized as self, must, as it might be as 
thing itself recognized — and not thing as ob- 
ject — which is to say as it might be subject, 
which is the only correlative of object, which 
was recognized — be something not the 
thinker as by self was to be understood the 
thinker. Or, I have directly and positive- 
ly demonstrated, what is to the same effect, 
that the self, as also the I or ego which is 
only something as referring to self and sub- 
ject, is an idea, that of subject as subject; 
subject a something a mere standoff to some- 
thing with which it is correlated, of object; 
that, as an idea, it is something thought and 
not something thinking or thinker which is 
something as wide as the poles asunder from 
it; that, as only an idea and something 



86 AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF THE I OR EGO. 

thought, it is neither conscious nor self-con- 
scious; that yet it should appear to be 
even both is explicable only as is understood 
the thinker to be lost in his own idea of sub- 
ject, subject as self and I or ego, when that 
the self and I or ego should appear as con- 
scious and self-conscious, would be inevitable; 
that as not conscious nor self-conscious, • it 
is to the effect that you the reader and I the 
writer are neither conscious nor self-con- 
scious, much as we may fancy that we are; 
and that the I or ego, which is to say that 
we, are so is an illusion, and the I or ego it- 
self, in effect at least, an interloper and im- 
postor and a colossal one, — all of which is 
as I set out in the beginning to prove. 

Moreover, not only have we found the self 
and I or ego to be not the thinker, and not 
something conscious and self-conscious, not 
only found them, in short, only an idea but 
an idea the most gossamerish, the most voli- 
tile and shifting in tenure, it were possible to 
imagine. 

Think of it! — the self and I or ego of self- 
consciousness, that is, you and I but a some- 



We Ourselves Only An Idea. 87 

thing a mere stand-off, a mere assertion of 
stand-off-ness from something else! Could 
anything more insubstantial be conceived? 
And, in fact, if ever there was a thing the 
most shadowy of the shadowy, a mere fleck 
of foam on the crest of the wave, a shear 
bubble of pretentions and fitful and flittering 
existence, it is this thing of a very upstart of 
the self and I or ego of what passes for the 
self-consciousness of the thinker. All the 
world's greatest thought and greatest accom- 
plishment is wrought with it off the stage 
completely. As every one understands, as 
whoever intellectually is profoundly and ear- 
nestly occupied with any matter, he loses 
all consciousness of self and the I or ego. 
And it is the same in all abandon to great 
physical exertion. The self (the self of self- 
consciousness) and I or ego are (is) at such 
moments, not merely submerged or in abey- 
ance, for the time being, — as might be sup- 
posed was the case as they referred to the 
thinker, — not merely in retreat within the 
wings of the stage, so to speak, but they are 
absolutely non est. The self, and of course, 



SS AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF THE I OR EGO. 

by implication, the I or ego which is only 
something as referring to it, has actually 
no more existence at such time than have 
subject itself, with which it is identified, and 
its correlate of object, in the absence of a 
thinker. 

And yet this thing and degenerate of self 
and I or ego of self-consciousness when it is 
on the stage, — and it is there no little of the 
time, — takes up the whole of it, and poses 
and struts as were itself the whole thing and 
did everything — the whole thing and did 
everything, still that it is itself scarcely any- 
thing and accomplishes, it itself, nothing! 

The truth is, that self-consciousness as 
such, conscious of self as self, would seem to 
be a sort of lapse, abberation or degenercy 
of consciousness instead of the very acme of 
its normal culmination as we are prone to 
think it, and flatter ourselves in thinking it. 
Flatter ourselves, — and, yet, with what 
reason, when we contemplate for a moment 
the wonders that even vegetable life alone 
works in the absence, as we have only reason 



We Ourselves Only An Idea. 89 

to suppose, of all consciousness of self as 
self, — wonders, beside which the many 
achievements of man, wonderful as they are, 
are as nothing in the comparison; and which 
the very self-consciousness of man, indeed, 
would seem even to operate in contravention 
of his working. Rather, would what is only 
consciousness seem the higher and highest 
consciousness. Rather, I say, would al- 
most seem the consciousness of the oyster 
higher than any that distinctive of man. 

Anyway much the stage or form of it of 
the above would appear to be that which 
alone is enduring and eternal, as any is so; 
while the stage or form recognized as con- 
sciousness of self as self w r ould seem some- 
thing only ephemeral in the extreme, as 
ephemeral as any other phenomenon, only 
which — a phenomenon — is consciousness of 
self as self: only which — a phenomenon — 
which is to say, only that which is an idea 
actualized and the result of reaction with 
environment, as is anything, as it is such, 
but a phenomenon. Only a phenomenon, 
— and thus what, in fact, is self-conscious- 



90 AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF THE I OR EGO. 

ness as what, also, is the I or ego, namely 
but a bubble upon the surface which bursts 
permanently with the death of the body, or 
soon after, as the caterpillar is but a thing 
of the moment which passes with the condi- 
tion of the chrysalis, or soon after even yet 
that continuing for a little as the butterfly, 
even, again, as may we ourselves continue 
for a little after this life is passed. Pos- 
sibly the thinker himself(or itself)may sur- 
vive the death of the body still that the 
I or ego should not. But, if the thinker 
does, then it is, as it were, the actor come 
to himself — only with this difference that 
the actor in fact recalls that he has been 
acting and the part that he has been act- 
ing while the thinker does not — or does 
so but fitfully at the most. Rather the 
latter, is like the somnambulist who, still 
that he on waking comes to himself, has 
no recollection of his somnambulic con- 
sciousness or the part, as it were, he has 
been acting. 



THE 

PARALLEL OF THE WORLD WITHIN 

AND THE WORLD WITHOUT. 



14 



THE WORLD WITHIN LIKE THAT 
WITHOUT. 



Before bringing the theme in the main, 
in hand, to a close, it seems, in view of all 
this which has been dwelt upon of the na- 
ture of the self(and its tender of I or ego)of 
self-consciousness as the one content of con- 
sciousness, an exception, as seeming to be 
itself conscious still that not so, among an 
almost infinity of contents which do not even 
seem to be— it seems, in view of it all, 
worthy of remark the something like a par- 
allel of the world within to the world with- 
out. 

Thus the numberless objects of the exter- 
nal world, for the most part, seem immersed 
in and seen, not by a light of their own, but by 
the light of the sun. So do the infinitely 
multifarious contents of the consciousness 
as of the internal world, in the main, seem 
thus immersed in and seen, not by a con- 



94 AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF THE I OR EGO. 

sciousness of their own but by an alien con- 
sciousness that of some entity which we can 
no better understand than as thinker. 

But in the physical universe, again, there 
is one exception to this rule of an object 
conspicuous and with which we are familiar 
far above every other and which is the glory 
of the night, namely, the moon, that ap- 
pears of itself to shine, and yet does not but 
only of a reflected light. And so, too, once 
more in the mental or psychological universe 
is one exception to a similar rule of an ob- 
ject not only conspicuous and with which we 
are familiar far above every other, but most 
obtrusively so, and even to a degree and be- 
times most offensively so and, in the minds 
of not a few so-called good people, most 
harmfully, and that one exception is the 
abstraction of the self of self-consciousness 
which seems to be conscious yet that it is 
not. 

The self is, indeed, we may say, the moon 
of the inward and altogether mental uni- 
verse. 

Then, again still, in the history of men's 



World Within Like That Without. 95 

convictions as to the two moons, there runs 
something the same parallel. The vast ma- 
jority of the human race even to-day are vic- 
tims both of the illusion and of the delusion 
that the moon of the physical universe shines 
of its own light; and, doubtless, for long 
ages of mankind upon the globe, not a hu- 
man being but supposed it did. So, on the 
other hand, even to-day and even, too, prac- 
tically everybody the world over, our pro- 
fessors of- metaphysics and psychology of 
our unversities with the rest, labor under a 
like psychological abberation of comprehen- 
sion and to the effect that the moon, as it 
were, of the psychological world is conscious 
of its own consciousness, that is, that what is 
only an appearance of the self and I or ego 
conscious and self-conscious is reality. They 
are, one and all, as innocent of any suspicion 
that what is appearance in the matter is 
only appearance as is any Fiji islander that 
the moon of his physical heavens does not 
shine of its own light. And they one and 
all, too, doubtless, will be given over to all, 
every whit, the asinine incredulity and scoff- 



96 AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF THE I OR EGO. 

ing as to their pet and private moon which 
those savages might be supposed to give way 
to as to the more public one of their famil- 
iarity and ours as any question was raised 
among them as to that's shining of its own 
light. 

But we will not forget that, all the same, 
it may be, after all, not any less a delusion in 
the one case than in the other. 



OBJECTIONS; THE INSANITY OF MAN. 



THE INSANITY OF MAN. 



Before coming to the main matter of this 
chapter, let me note that, doubtless, even 
still, it will be insisted that, after all, practi- 
cally at least, the I or ego is conscious; that, 
with Macready as the king, and lost in the 
part, it is, at least practically, the king con- 
scious; and so, that with the thinker lost in 
the idea of the subject as subject and the I 
or ego, it is, at least practically, the subject 
and I or ego conscious and self-conscious. 
But wait: Suppose for illustration again — 
yet that it be in effect but to reiterate what 
has been already perhaps tediously dwelt on, 
that some John Smith were suddenly under 
the conviction that he was some one else, 
some noted person, was, say, some Prof. 
James of the nearby university, and should 
even invade the lecture room with the view 
to lecturing as very the professor himself, 
on psychology; would you say that the Prof. 
15 LofC. 



100 AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF THE I OR EGO. 

James of John Smith's imagining was con- 
scious? Would you not say, rather, that it 
was John Smith conscious of the idea of being 
Prof. James and lost in that idea, the while 
that it was John Smith himself, and only 
John Smith conscious, and nothing of any 
Prof. James of Smith's imagining, that was 
so? And, consistently with this, what else 
could be said than that it was the thinker 
conscious of the idea of subject as subject 
and I or ego and lost in that idea, the while, 
as above, that it was the thinker himself 
(or itself) and only the thinker, and not the 
subject and I or ego of his idea which was 
that which was conscious? 

And even yet, after all, do you say that 
practically John Smith was Prof. James, and 
admit him to the university lecture room to 
lecture and pay him Prof. James' salary for 
the service rendered? This, in all consis- 
tency, you should do, if John Smith's imag- 
ining himself Prof. James is practically John 
Smith's being Prof. James; for this is only on 
a par with your saying that the thinker's 
imagining himself the I or ego and the I or 



The Insanity Of Man. 101 

ego conscious is practically the I or ego con- 
scious. Besides, what has become of the 
original Prof. James? — is he snuffed out of 
existence? — or is there two of him driving 
business at the same stand? 

However, it is idle to deny that practically, 
true enough in a sense, the sun rises and sets; 
and that practically true enough in the same 
sense the I or ego, which is to say you and 
I, are conscious and self-conscious, still that, 
speaking with exact fidelity to the fact, nei- 
ther is literally true. But here in this trea- 
tise it is altogether with what is literally true 
with which we have to deal and not with 
what is merely practically true, true whether 
one way or another. 

But to say no more of this. 

And now for the matter chiefly in hand in 
this chapter. 

For another objection it will be said that 
John Smith lost in the idea of his being some- 
one else is to the effect of John Smith in- 
sane, as Macready lost in the part of the king 
and never coming to himself to know he was 



102 AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF THE I OR EGO. 

not the king, would be said to be insane; 
and thus, John Smith, in the situation, in- 
sane, is to the effect of the thinker insane, 
and even man himself, insane, — at least 
tainted with insanity as the creature of it, — 
if this be objected, then I ask — What of it? 
If it be urged that it is incredible enough 
that the I or ego is not, that I myself am 
not conscious, that, yet, as if to add to in- 
credibility, it should, besides, be said that 
only as man is not conscious is he not in- 
sane; or, at least, be said that the whoever 
or whatever not me but back of me and doing 
thinking and business in my name is, him- 
self or itself insane, then I ask again — What 
of it? I say what of it that, carried out to 
its logical conclusion, what I have been con- 
tending only brings up with much this prop- 
osition of the insanity of man, or, at least, 
of man the creature of insanity? What of 
it, I repeat, since, still, even then I would 
only be arguing in the set form of philoso- 
phy what Shakespeare ventures to exploit in 
the form of a drama, in the character of 
Hamlet ? For, it would appear that that 



The Insanity Of Man. 103 

greatest of poets and dramatists in the char- 
acter and drama of Hamlet, meant not only 
no individual man especially, but man ; but 
moreover, not man merely, but man a com- 
posite of two beings, one sane and the other in- 
sane, as a photograph may be a composite 
picture of two men of very different features. 
In a word, Shakespeare in the character 
and drama of Hamlet meant to represent 
man as both sane and insane: and hence, of 
course, all the confusion of the interpreters 
and critics of the drama. And as the com- 
posite photograph produces more or less mod- 
ified the features and peculiarities of each, 
so the composite dramatic character, char- 
acter a composite of a sane man and an in- 
sane one, must exhibit what are, the more or 
less modified, still very the characteristics of 
the insane mind and conduct as well as of 
the sane; and exhibit what, indeed, in actual 
life would be met with only as veritable in- 
sanity itself, obtained back of all what were 
at least the symptoms of it. 

If, then, the proposition of the I or ego as 



104 AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF THE I OR EGO. 

not itself conscious brings up. at last with 
that of man the offspring, at least, of insan- 
ity and tainted with it, if not, indeed, of al- 
together unsound mind, it only brings up 
with what has been ventured to assume in 
dramatic form by the greatest poet and dra- 
matist that ever lived; and can command that 
endorsement if can no other. 

As to the fact of man's insanity, doubtless 
Shakespeare did not, in his time, want in 
what he observed in men's thought and con- 
duct, and no more does the present writer 
in his, for the most ample evidence of it; 
evidence which, if met with in only the few 
instead of the mass of mankind as it is, 
would be all-sufficient in the judgment of any 
reputable alienist to commit the subjects of 
it to an insane asylum forthwith. In other 
words, such few are only saved, this mo- 
ment, from the madhouse in that their afflic- 
tion is the affliction of all mankind. 

When the head of a great nation with 
that great nation itself and even the church 
back of him, his accomplices in the crime, 
affects to murder of right fifty thousand even 



The Insanity Of Man. 105 

Christian human beings guilty of no crime 
but of wanting their liberty, and all for gain 
as is only what ( murder for gain ) any 
highwayman or pirate does — is there no in- 
sanity in it? Or, when men of repute for 
extraordinary intellect and moral worth, 
perhaps of the measure of a Jonathan Ed- 
wards, can believe that a beneficent and just 
Deity could pave a hell with infants' skulls 
— is there nothing of insanity in mind that 
can but see those most contradictory things 
as hanging together? Then consider that a 
thousand volumes of a thousand pages each 
could be filled to overflowing with the like 
incongruous in the thought and conduct of 
men; — and, yet, no insanity in man — man 
as man? — ! 



SUxMMARY WITH CLOSING COMMENT. 



16 



SUMMARY WITH CLOSING COMMENT. 



We have found it may be said in final re- 
capitulation to this effect; — That I myself, 
speaking of myself representatively, am not 
an entity as distinct from consciousness and 
back of it of which consciousness connotes 
some function, attribute or accident; that, 
then again, I am not even consciousness it- 
self — be that an entity or what not, — nor 
even, strange to say, so much as conscious; 
that, rather, I am only an idea, that idea as 
actualized and made manifest, which is to 
say, made a phenomenon, made so as in the 
idea is lost the author of it, — the author of 
it which (or who) antedates the idea and is 
really that only which is conscious and the 
presumptive thinker; and that, therefore, in 
my still posing as shining by my own light, 
posing as conscious as of my own conscious- 
ness, or, as, indeed, conscious, myself at all, 
there is in effect, collossal imposture, and I, 
myself thus posing, the colossal, tho, perhaps, 



110 AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF THE I OR EGO. 

unwitting impostor: found to this effect and, 
moreover, further found that the idea only 
which I myself, am or to which refer is that 
of subject, subject as subject which, in 
fact, is nothing in or of itself, and something 
at all only as relative to something else that 
something else it, too, nothing in or of itself 
and something at all and object only as rela- 
tive to subject; that the idea only which I 
am or to which refer is but this of sub- 
ject and which as that is nothing in or of it- 
self and something at all only as relative to 
something else, and an abstraction, so am I, 
too, necessarily, as being or referring to it 
(the subject), I, too, as is it, nothing in or 
of myself and something at all only as 
relative to something else, and an abstrac- 
tion; and which, as I am, I am but the 
airiest of existences, but the airiest and 
of only the claim to the rank of an entity 
that either of the superficies of a plane 
has, either of which has no being but as 
the other has, or, for that matter, that 
has even the plane itself which is only 
the equivocal being of the superficies 



Summary With Closing Comment. Ill 

themselves; am, I say, but this airiest, flim- 
siest, the most contingent and evanescent 
imaginable of existences, and nothing an ab- 
solute existence at all such as may the pre- 
sumptive thinker and my raison d'etre for 
being haply be; nothing such and nothing 
anything as could even affect to be an exist- 
ence at all but as lost in me is this same 
thinker, lost in the conscious offspring the 
conscious parent. 

In a word, we have found, in effect, that 
the lor ego, which is to say I myself, am only 
the unconscious guest of a conscious host, 
the unconscious guest masquerading in the 
livery, tho ail-unconsciously as in that liv- 
ery, of the conscious host; and masquera- 
ding, indeed, even the host, the father, yet 
that all unconsciously the father, in the livery 
of the guest, the son — the son, yet that, 
again, all unconsciously the son as the father 
the father. 

Of course, as I now may add, with what- 
ever indisputable logic and clearness of expo- 
sition the matter of this dissertation is pre- 



112 AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF THE I OR EGO. 

sented, it will, still, seem incredible to the 
common mind at least, as it will to others 
only in less measure, that anything whatso- 
ever, should think itself conscious when it 
was not; that that only of which there was 
consciousness should still think itself as that 
as having consciousness on its own account; 
that the I or ego, which is to say that the 
reader himself, himself as he conceives him- 
self, should be merely the result of thinking 
and an idea, rather than that which itself 
thinks and has, itself, ideas; that the thinker 
should be lost a whole life-long in one of his 
own ideas, never once coming to himself to 
know directly that he is so lost; that the son, 
yet that he is only the son, should still mis- 
take himself for his own father — that he 
should do this and should pose in the livery 
of his father for three score years and ten, 
perhaps, never once knowing it as only the 
livery of his own father, — this will all, I say, 
at first at least, seem incredible. 

But it must be remembered that every ex- 
ternal object all unconsciously falls, prima- 
rily, on the retina of the physical eye, upside- 



Summary With Closing Comment. 113 

down; which, however, the mind as ail- 
unconsciously corrects — doubtless thru expe- 
rience — to rightside-up. And may it not be 
only what should be expected that matter the 
subject of our conception, or reflection, too, 
as above with matter of our perception, thus 
fall as ail-unconsciously on a corresponding 
more interior retina as it were, of the mind, 
upside-down, and which, only reflection and 
an altogether advanced intelligence can, as 
does only experience in the case of percep- 
tion, correct to rightside-up — only reflec- 
tion and an altogether advanced intelligence, 
which, yet, has not hitherto, it must be al- 
lowed, obtained to correct? 

At all events, what I have ventured to rank 
as a demonstration makes it certain that 
much this is the case. 

One word more. 

This may be the first time in the history 
of philosophy when was seriously attempted 
to show that the I or ego does not think, nor 
is even conscious, — to show that conviction 
to this effect is but illusion and delusion. 



114 AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF THE I OR EGO. 

But there is a first time to everything as ever 
there is any time. Mankind has been on the 
planet some 100,000 years more or less, and 
only the day before yesterday, as it were, 
did even the more intelligent learn of the 
illusion of the sun's apparent rising and set- 
ting; while the vast multitude, even yet, 
are in the bondage not only of the illusion 
of it, but of the delusion of it, being still of 
the impression that what is only appearance 
is the literal fact. And it is as it were even 
only yesterday, indeed, that someone and 
few were rescued from the delusion — from 
the illusion of which none ever can be — that 
there is green in the grass, when unless mod- 
ern science and philosophy are woefully at 
fault, there is none there at all; no visual 
green there at all, but only in the eye and 
mind which lodge it there; while the innu- 
merable many, even yet, entertain not so 
much as a suspicion that it is not in the 
grass, itself, as appears. Indeed, the era of 
modern science and philosophy has barely 
come in before it is discovered that we are 
steeped to the eyes and ears and above them 



Summary With Closing Comment. 115 

in illusion and delusion; and that human 
progress threatens to consist more in work- 
ing clear of the latter, if not of the former, 
than of anything else. It, therefore, should 
be nothing overmuch to be wondered at if, at 
last, we are to be made aware that that the 
I or ego is conscious, is covered in with the 
rest in the general misapprehension of the 
situation. 

And, yet, the situation may be understood. 
As it is illusion, it is pardonable because in 
part, or altogether, unavoidable; but as it 
is delusion, it is simply ignorance and, save 
temporarily at best, without excuse. 

Finally, it may be noted that precisely 
whoever or whatever may be the presump- 
tive thinker to whom or which in the course 
of this writing reference has been made, it 
has not been in the mind of the writer at this 
time to divulge and exploit; it is enough 
now and here as has been shown that he or 
it is not the I or ego; that to nothing him or 
it does I or ego refer, but to the subject — 
subject in the consciousness as self — which 
is not at all the thinker. 



DEC 28 1903 



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